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BIOSOCIALITY,	  REIMAGINED:	  A	  GLOBAL	  DISTRIBUTIVE	  JUSTICE	  FRAMEWORK	  FOR	  OWNERSHIP	  OF	  HUMAN	  GENETIC	  MATERIAL	  DAVID	  J.	  JEFFERSON1*	  “It	  is	  now	  essential	  to	  find	  legal	  rules	  that	  can	  take	  account	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  human	  body,	  more	  than	  a	  thing,	  is	  a	  tangible	  and	  intangible	  complex,	  dissociable	  from	  the	  subject	  that	  shelters	  (or	  sheltered)	  it,	  in	  the	  service	  of	  diverse	  interests,	  not	  necessarily	  divergent,	  but	  that	  must	  be	  prioritized	  appropriately.”2	  	  Genomic	   biobanks—repositories	   of	   human	   genetic	   material	   for	  research	  use—serve	  increasingly	  important	  functions	  in	  contemporary	  global	  society.	   	  Biobanks	  collect,	  store,	  process,	  and	  distribute	  biologi-­‐cal	  specimens	  and	  associated	  data	  collected	  from	  patients	  and	  research	  participants,	  facilitating	  research	  that	  connects	  these	  data	  with	  clinical	  responses.3	   	   In	   other	   words,	   aggregating	   genetic	   material	   in	   these	  banks	   allows	   researchers	   to	   better	   understand	   disease	   epidemiologi-­‐cally	   and	   to	   develop	   modalities	   for	   treatment	   that	   act	   precisely	   and	  efficiently.	  The	   assemblage	   of	   personal	   health	   information	   and	   human	  DNA	  represents	  exciting	  possibilities	  for	  managing	  and	  mitigating	  suffering	  on	  a	  global	  scale.	   	  However,	   the	  practice	  of	  biobanking	  is	  complicated	  by	  the	  complex	  relationship	  between	  altruistic	  notions	  of	  research	  for	  the	   greater	   good,	   and	   flows	   of	   capital	   between	   funders,	   researchers,	  and	  markets.	  	  Furthermore,	  biobanks	  illustrate	  what	  some	  have	  called	  a	   “new	   distributive	   politics	   of	   biomedical	   research,”	   in	   which	   “the	  commodification	  of	  persons	  .	  .	  .	  has	  challenged	   the	  ontological,	   ethical,	  and	  political	  underpinnings	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  between	  researchers	  and	  their	  human	  subjects.”4	  	  The	  basic	  dilemma	  is	  twofold.	  	  First,	  how	  should	  capital	  accumulated	  from	  the	  sales	  of	  biotechnological	  products	  	  	   	  *	  M.A.,	  Suffolk	  University	  (Community	  Psychology);	  J.D.,	  University	  of	  California,	  Davis.	  Law	  &	  Policy	  Analyst	  at	  The	  Public	  Intellectual	  Property	  Resource	  for	  Agriculture.	  	   2.	   	  Florence	  Bellivier	  &	  Christine	  Noiville,	  The	  Circulation	  of	  Human	  Body	  Parts	  and	  Prod-­‐
ucts:	  When	  Exclusive	  Property	  Rights	  Mask	  the	  Issue	  of	  Access,	  in	  BIOBANKS	  AND	  TISSUE	  RESEARCH:	  THE	  PUBLIC,	   THE	  PATIENT,	   AND	   THE	  REGULATION	  211	   (Christian	   Lenk,	   Judit	   Sándor,	  &	  Bert	  Gordijn	   eds.,	  2011).	  	   3.	   	  Jennifer	   Girod	   &	   Katherine	   Drabiak,	   A	   Proposal	   for	   Comprehensive	   Biobank	   Research	  
Laws	  to	  Promote	  Translational	  Medicine	  in	  Indiana,	  5	  IND.	  HEALTH	  L.	  REV.	  217,	  219	  (2008).	  	   4.	   	  David	  E.	  Winickoff,	  Partnership	  in	  U.K.	  Biobank:	  A	  Third	  Way	  for	  Genomic	  Property?	  35	  J.L.	  MED.	  &	  ETHICS	  440,	  440	  (2007).	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  developed	  from	  donated	  human	  genetic	  material	  (HGM)	  be	  allocated?	  	  Second,	  and	  even	  more	  fundamentally,	  to	  whom	  should	  property	  rights	  in	  HGM	  be	  assigned?	  The	   present	   Article	   will	   explore	   this	   dilemma	   through	   several	  parts.	   	  Part	  I	  will	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  biobanks,	   including	  explora-­‐tions	   of	   underlying	   scientific,	   historical,	   and	   sociocultural	   functions.	  	  This	  part	  will	  also	  present	  the	  ethical,	  legal,	  and	  social	  issues	  implicat-­‐ed	   by	   the	   practice	   of	   biobanking—especially	   when	   on	   a	   national	   or	  international	   scale.	   	   Next,	   Part	   II	   will	   outline	   the	   United	   States’	   legal	  framework	  for	  both	  ethical	  regulation	  of	  human	  subject	  research,	  and	  the	  allocation	  of	  property	  rights	  in	  HGM.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  dominant	  United	  States	  model,	  various	  alterna-­‐tive	   paradigms	   for	   ownership	   over	   HGM	   have	   attempted	   to	   balance	  competing	  interests	  between	  exclusion	  and	  access;	  private	  and	  public;	  altruism	  and	  ownership;	  and	  individual	  and	  community.	  	  These	  models	  will	  be	  surveyed	  in	  Part	  III,	  and	  both	  the	  dominant	  Western	  paradigm,5	  as	   well	   as	   alternatives	   based	   on	   diverse	   cultural	   values,	   will	   be	   cri-­‐tiqued.	  	  Subsequently,	  Part	  IV	  will	  reframe	  the	  property	  rights	  dilemma	  in	  the	  context	  of	  distributive	  justice.	  	  Here	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  new	  modes	  of	   “biosociality”	   have	   entered	   into	   modern	   global	   society,	   such	   that	  scientific	  understandings	  of	  human	  genetics	  have	  reshaped	  social	  and	  cultural	   dynamics.6	   	   Based	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   collective	   rights	   in	  genetic	  group	  identities,	  the	  Western	  framework	  for	  the	  assignment	  of	  property	   rights	   over	   human	   genetic	  material	   provides	   an	   inadequate	  basis	  for	  the	  realization	  of	  distributive	  justice.	  Thus,	  Part	  V	  will	  propose	  that,	  prior	  to	  determining	  which	  model	  should	   govern	   property	   rights	   in	   human	   genetic	   material,	   we	   must	  reimagine	  the	  Western	  paradigm	  for	  property	  ownership.	  	  My	  conten-­‐tion	   is	   that	   in	  order	   to	  actualize	  distributive	   justice,	  we	  must	  reframe	  the	  ownership	  debate	  in	  collective,	  rather	  than	  individual,	  terms.	  	  In	  so	  doing,	  national	  and	  international	  tangible	  and	  intellectual	  property	  law	  regimes	   should	   recognize	   that	   groups	   of	   people	   who	   share	   common	  genetics	   also	   share	   interests	   in	   their	  own	  genetic	  material,	   as	  well	   as	  any	   biotechnological	   products	   created	   using	   their	   DNA	   samples.	  	  	  	   5.	   	  In	  extremely	  simplified	  terms—which	  will	  be	  sufficient	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  Article—the	  Western	  paradigm	  is	  one	  of	  private,	  rather	  than	  collective,	  ownership	  of	  property.	  See	  Harold	  Demsetz,	  Toward	  a	  Theory	  of	  Property	  Rights	   II:	  The	  Competition	  Between	  Private	  and	  Collective	  
Ownership,	  31	   J.	  LEGAL	  STUDIES	  S653,	  S667	  (2002)	  (overviewing	   the	  rise	  of	  private	  ownership	   in	  the	  West,	  beginning	  in	  Ancient	  Greek	  states	  and	  the	  Roman	  Empire,	  and	  increasing	  in	  significance	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  industrial	  revolution	  and	  economic	  specialization.).	  	  	   6.	   	  See	   Marianne	   Sommer,	   DNA	   and	   Cultures	   of	   Remembrance:	   Anthropological	   Genetics,	  
Biohistories	  and	  Biosocialities,	  5	  BIOSOCIETIES	  366	  (2010).	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  Therefore,	  these	  groups	  should,	  at	  minimum,	  be	  afforded	  access	  to,	  and	  some	  of	   the	  privileges	  and	  benefits	  associated	  with,	   the	  ownership	  of	  such	  products.	  I.	  BIOBANKS:	  THE	  SCIENCE,	  THE	  HISTORY,	  THE	  ISSUES	  Conceptually,	  the	  practice	  of	  biobanking	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  “new	  genetics”	  movement,	  which,	  according	  to	  its	  proponents,	  will	  “lay	  the	  groundwork	  for	  ‘personalized’	  medicine	  by	  allowing	  a	  better	  match	  between	  the	  drug	  and	  the	   individual	  genetic	  profile,	  while	   ‘empower-­‐ing’	  the	  individual	  by	  offering	  greater	  certainty	  about	  their	  health	  sta-­‐tus	  and	  more	  options	  in	  healthcare	  decisions.”7	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  public	  health,	   biobanks	   are	   seen	   as	   generators	   of	   population-­‐based	   preven-­‐tive	   interventions,	  since	  they	  compile	  data	  surrounding	   individual	  ge-­‐netics,	   lifestyle,	  and	  the	   impact	  of	  environment	  on	  disease.8	   	  For	  both	  individual	   and	   population-­‐based	   applications,	   biobanks	   are	   broadly	  defined	  as	  collections	  of	  human	  biological	  material,	  in	  association	  with	  personal	   medical,	   genealogical,	   environmental,	   and	   lifestyle	   infor-­‐mation.	   	   Biobanks	   exist	   in	   many	   different	   forms	   within	   clinical,	   re-­‐search,	  and	  judiciary	  settings.9	  Notwithstanding	   this	   diversity,	   all	   biobanks	   implicate	   controver-­‐sial	  questions.	   	  These	  ethical,	   legal,	  and	  social	  issues	  (ELSI)	  have	  been	  broadly	  discussed.	  	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  National	  Hu-­‐man	  Genome	  Research	  Institute’s	  2011	  ELSI	  Congress	  identified	  three	  pivotal	  factors	  currently	  shaping	  genomic	  research,	  its	  clinical	  transla-­‐tion,	  and	  its	  societal	  implications:	  (1)	  the	  increasingly	  blurred	  bounda-­‐ry	  between	  research	  and	  treatment;	  (2)	  uncertainty,	  i.e.,	  the	  indefinite,	  indeterminate,	   and	   incomplete	   nature	   of	   much	   genomic	   information	  and	  the	  challenges	  that	  arise	   from	  making	  meaning	  and	  use	  of	   it;	  and	  (3)	   the	   role	   of	   negotiations	   between	   multiple	   scientific	   and	   non-­‐scientific	  stakeholders	   in	  setting	   the	  priorities	   for	  and	  direction	  of	  bi-­‐omedical	  research.10	  	  These	  factors	  illustrate	  broad,	  thematic	  challeng-­‐es	   that	   the	   biomedical	   community	   and	   policymakers	   will	   likely	   be	  forced	  to	  grapple	  with	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  
	  	   7.	   	  Herbert	   Gottweis	   &	   Alan	   Petersen,	   Biobanks	   and	   Governance:	   An	   Introduction,	   in	  BIOBANKS:	   GOVERNANCE	   IN	   COMPARATIVE	   PERSPECTIVE	   3	   (Herbert	   Gottweis	   &	   Alan	   Petersen	   eds.,	  2008).	  	   8.	   	  Id.	  	   9.	   	  Id.	  at	  5.	  	   10.	   	  Gail	  E.	  Henderson	  et	  al.,	  What	  Research	  Ethics	  Should	  Learn	   from	  Genomics	  and	  Society	  
Research:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  ELSI	  Congress	  of	  2011,	  40	  J.L.	  MED.	  &	  ETHICS	  1008,	  1009	  (2012).	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  Meanwhile,	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   specific	   ELSI	   have	   also	   been	   identified	   in	   the	  context	  of	  large-­‐scale	  biobanking	  initiatives.	  	  For	  instance,	  K.L.	  Hoeyer	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Public	  Health	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Denmark	  noted	  that	  “[t]he	  larger	  the	  biobank,	  the	  more	  complex	  the	  social	  maneuver-­‐ing.”11	  	  According	  to	  Hoeyer,	  the	  shift	  in	  scale	  towards	  larger	  initiatives	  has	   organizational,	   communicative,	   epistemic,	   and	   cultural	   effects.12	  	  These	  social	   impacts	  reflect	  changes	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  indi-­‐viduals,	  states,	  and	  markets,	  which	  in	  turn	  lead	  to	  legal	  challenges	  re-­‐lated	  to	  (1)	  the	  need	  for	  harmonization	  of	  the	  rules	  governing	  biobank	  research;	  and	  (2)	  the	  need	  for	  legal	  agreement	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  body	  parts	  can	  be	  considered	  property,	  and	  who	  is	  entitled	  to	  benefits	  derived	   from	   such	   property.13	   	   This	   Article	   will	   focus	   on	   this	   latter	  need—defining	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  property	  right	  in	  human	  genetic	  material.	  The	   ELSI	   surrounding	   biobanks—especially	   when	   large-­‐scale—are	   common	   to	   all	   countries	   in	   which	   these	   repositories	   have	   been	  created.	   	  However,	   especially	   peculiar	   legal	   challenges	   have	   arisen	   in	  the	  United	  States,	  due	  to	  its	  patchwork	  of	  federal	  and	  state	  laws,	  creat-­‐ed	  by	   legislatures	   in	   some	   instances,	   and	  by	   judges	   in	   others.	   	  Under	  the	   fragmented	  American	   framework,	   the	   ethical	   issues	   that	   genomic	  research	   implicates	   tend	   to	  be	   governed	  by	   federal	   statutory	   law.	   	   In	  contrast,	   the	   legal	   issues	   have	   almost	   exclusively	   been	   relegated	   to	  state	  courts,	  which	  have	  applied	  the	  laws	  of	  their	  separate	  jurisdictions	  to	   create	   a	   complicated	   scaffolding	   for	   the	   assignment	   of	   property	  rights	  in	  human	  biological	  materials.	  II.	  COMMODIFICATION	  OF	  THE	  BODY:	  HUMAN	  GENETICS,	  MEDICAL	  RESEARCH,	  AND	  AMERICAN	  LAW	  In	   the	   United	   States,	   two	   separate	   legal	   frameworks	   exist	   to	   ad-­‐dress	  the	  practices	  surrounding	  biobanking	  of	  human	  genetic	  material.	  	  Federal	   statutes	   and	   regulations	   broadly	   govern	   ethics	   in	   research	  involving	  human	  subjects,	  as	  well	  as	  protection	  of	  the	  confidentiality	  of	  	  	   11.	   	  Klaus	  Lindgaard	  Hoeyer,	  Size	  Matters:	  The	  Ethical,	  Legal,	  and	  Social	   Issues	  Surrounding	  
Large-­‐Scale	  Genetic	  Biobank	  Initiatives,	  21	  NORSK	  EPIDEMIOLOGI	  211,	  212	  (2012).	  	   12.	   	  Id.	   	   See	  also	  Anne	  Cambon-­‐Thomsen,	  The	  Social	  and	  Ethical	   Issues	  of	  Post-­‐Genomic	  Hu-­‐
man	  Biobanks,	  5	  NATURE	  REVIEWS:	  GENETICS	  866,	  866	  (2004)	  (arguing	  that	  in	  all	  countries,	  biobank-­‐ing	   has	   raised	   similar	   issues,	   including:	   (1)	   the	   tension	   that	   exists	   between	   the	   rights	   of	  individuals	  or	  groups	  and	  the	  routes	  towards	  research	  progress;	  (2)	  the	  need	  to	  provide	  adequate	  informed	  consent;	  (3)	  the	  difficulty	  of	  reconciling	  the	  non-­‐commercial	  use	  of	  human	  body	  parts	  with	  the	  growing	  role	  of	  commercial	  biobanks;	  and	  (4)	  how	  best	  to	  ensure	  the	  optimal	  and	  trans-­‐parent	  use	  of	  biobanks	  while	  defining	   the	   rights	  of	  priority	  or	   researchers	  and	  companies	  over	  samples	  and	  data).	  	   13.	   	  Hoeyer,	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  213–14.	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  personal	   health	   information.	   	   Meanwhile,	   the	   allocation	   of	   property	  rights	   for	   ownership	   of	   human	   genetic	   material	   has	   been	   conducted	  through	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  individual	  courts	  at	  the	  subnational	  level.	  	  The	  result	  is	  a	  tenuous	  status	  quo	  in	  which	  no	  national	  standard	  for	  the	  assignment	  of	  property	   rights	   in	  HGM	  exists,	   and	   in	  which	  global	  dy-­‐namics	  are	  not	  considered.	  
A.	  Regulation	  of	  Ethical	  Issues:	  Federal	  Statutory	  Law	  Nearly	  all	  research	  involving	  human	  subjects	  in	  the	  United	  States	  is	   governed	   by	   a	   set	   of	   federal	   regulations	   known	   collectively	   as	   the	  “Common	  Rule.”14	  	  The	  Common	  Rule’s	  mélange	  of	  regulations	  outline	  the	  basic	  provisions	   for	   Institutional	  Review	  Boards	   (IRBs),	   informed	  consent,	  and	  Assurances	  of	  Compliance	  for	  all	  fifteen	  participating	  de-­‐partments	  and	  agencies.15	  	  The	  new	  collection	  of	  biological	  materials	  or	  information	   from	  a	   person	   for	   research	  purposes,	   including	   biobank-­‐ing,	  triggers	  the	  Common	  Rule,	  as	  does	  any	  research	  not	  involving	  new	  information	   if	   it	  uses	  “identifiable	  private	   information”	  about	  an	   indi-­‐vidual.16	  Similarly,	  the	  Health	  Insurance	  Portability	  and	  Accountability	  Act	  of	   1996	   (“HIPAA”)	   covers	   research	   uses	   of	   “protected	   health	   infor-­‐mation”	  (“PHI”)	  associated	  with	   the	  specimens	   that	  biobanks	  contain,	  but	   does	   not	   apply	   to	   the	   specimens	   themselves.17	   	   HIPAA’s	   Privacy	  Rule	  prevents	  a	  covered	  entity	  from	  disclosing	  an	  individual’s	  PHI	  for	  research	   purposes	   without	   express	   authorization.	   	   The	   Privacy	   Rule	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  data	  that	  have	  been	  de-­‐identified	  through	  statistical-­‐ly-­‐approved	  methods	  or	  if	  most	  personally	  identifying	  information	  has	  been	  removed.18	   	  However,	  some	  categories	  of	  information	  which	  link	  an	  individual	  to	  a	  particular	  population	  group	  (e.g.,	  race,	  ethnicity,	  so-­‐cioeconomic	   status)	  may	   remain	   intact	  and	  still	  be	   considered	   legally	  
	  	   14.	   	  45	  C.F.R.	  §	  46.101	  (2005).	  	  The	  Common	  Rule	  was	  initially	  published	  in	  1991,	  and	  codi-­‐fied	  in	  separate	  regulations	  by	  15	  federal	  departments	  and	  agencies.	   	  The	  Department	  of	  Health	  and	  Human	  Services	  regulations	  are	  those	  which	  are	  contained	  in	  45	  C.F.R.	  pt.	  46.	  	  	  	   15.	   	  Federal	  Policy	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Subjects	  (‘Common	  Rule’),	  U.S.	  DEPT.	  OF	  HEALTH	  &	   HUMAN	   SERVICES,	   available	   at	   http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/commonrule/	   (last	  visited	  Apr.	  20,	  2013).	  	   16.	   	  Henry	  T.	  Greely,	  Breaking	  the	  Stalemate:	  A	  Prospective	  Regulatory	  Framework	  for	  Unfore-­‐
seen	  Research	  Uses	  of	  Human	  Tissue	  Samples	  and	  Health	  Information,	  34	  WAKE	  FOREST	  L.	  REV.	  737,	  739	  (1999).	  	   17.	   	  45	  C.F.R.	  §	  160.103.	  	  See	  also	  Girod	  &	  Drabiak,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  221.	  	   18.	   	  See	  Summary	  of	  the	  HIPAA	  Privacy	  Rule,	  U.S.	  DEPT.	  OF	  HEALTH	  &	  HUMAN	  SERVICES,	  available	  
at	   http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/index.html	   (last	   visited	  Apr.	  20,	  2013).	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  de-­‐identified,	  a	  fact	  that	  may	  leave	  open	  the	  possibility	  for	  discrimina-­‐tion19	  if	  data	  are	  misused.20	  As	   currently	   written	   the	   Common	   Rule	   and	   HIPAA	   do	   not	   ade-­‐quately	   address	   the	   unforeseen	   uses	   of	   previously	   collected	   genetic	  material,	   a	  problem	   that	  biobanks	  exacerbate.	   	  The	   issue	   is	  primarily	  one	   of	   giving	   adequate	   informed	   consent	   to	   research	   subjects,	   when	  information	  or	  material	  collected	   for	  one	  purpose	   is	   later	  determined	  to	  have	  value	  for	  additional,	  previously	  unforeseen	  purposes.	  	  In	  these	  instances,	   obtaining	   fresh	   informed	   consent	   for	   new	   research	   with	  previously	  collected	  materials	  has	  substantial	  costs,	  such	  as	  difficulties	  in	  locating	  donors,	  or	  the	  potential	  that	  they	  might	  refuse	  to	  consent	  to	  the	  new	  use	  of	  their	  donated	  materials.21	  Due	  to	  the	  inadequacies	  of	  the	  current	  framework,	  proposals	  have	  been	  advanced	  to	  reform	  the	  Common	  Rule	  and	  HIPAA	  to	  require	  dis-­‐cussion	  about	  the	  potential	  for	  unforeseen	  uses	  of	  genetic	  materials	  as	  a	  component	  of	  informed	  consent.22	  	  The	  need	  for	  such	  reform	  is	  acute	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  United	  States’	  property	  rights	  paradigm	  for	  human	  DNA.	   	   The	   U.S.	   model	   for	   ownership	   of	   HGM	   affords	   essentially	   no	  rights	   to	   the	   individuals	  who	  “donate”	   their	   tissues	   for	  research	  uses.	  	  Thus,	   adequate	   informed	   consent	   should	   be	   understood	   as	   the	  mini-­‐mum	  level	  of	  recognition	  for	  the	  rights	  of	  donors	  of	  HGM.	  
B.	  Definition	  of	  the	  Property	  Right:	  State	  Case	  Law	  The	  question	  of	  ownership	  of	  human	  genetic	  material	  in	  the	  Unit-­‐ed	   States	   arguably	   begins	   with	   the	   story	   of	   Henrietta	   Lacks,	   a	   poor	  African	  American	  woman	  who	  died	  of	  a	  virulent	  form	  of	  cervical	  cancer	  in	  the	  1950s.23	  	  Biological	  samples	  containing	  Ms.	  Lacks’	  genetic	  mate-­‐rial	   were	   taken	   during	   the	   course	   of	   her	   treatment,	   and	   researchers	  subsequently	  capitalized	  on	  the	  aggressive	  nature	  of	  her	  cancer	  cells	  to	  
	  	   19.	   	  Note,	  however,	  that	  in	  2008	  Congress	  passed	  the	  Genetic	  Information	  Nondiscrimination	  Act	   (GINA),	   which	   was	   “the	   first	   preemptive	   antidiscrimination	   statute	   in	   American	   history.”	  	  GINA	  prohibits	  genetic-­‐information	  discrimination	  in	  health	  insurance	  and	  employment	  contexts.	  	  Jessica	  L.	  Roberts,	  Preempting	  Discrimination:	  Lessons	   from	  the	  Genetic	   Information	  Nondiscrimi-­‐
nation	  Act,	  63	  VAND.	  L.	  REV.	  439,	  441	  (2010).	  	  	  	   20.	   	  Girod	  &	  Drabiak,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  222–25.	  	   21.	   	  Greely,	  supra	  note	  16,	  at	  740.	  	   22.	   	  See	  id.	  at	  752–56.	  	  Specifically,	  Greely	  proposes	  that	  the	  following	  issues	  be	  discussed	  at	  the	  time	  of	  obtaining	  informed	  consent:	  (1)	  permission	  for	  unforeseen	  research;	  (2)	  recontact;	  (3)	  withdrawal;	  (4)	  time	  limits;	  (5)	  availability	  of	  information	  or	  materials	  to	  third	  parties;	  (6)	  impli-­‐cations	  for	  groups;	  and	  (7)	  commercial	  uses.	  	   23.	   	  For	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  Ms.	  Lack’s	   life	  and	   legacy,	   see	  REBECCA	  SKLOOT,	  THE	   IMMORTAL	  LIFE	  OF	  HENRIETTA	  LACKS	  (2010).	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  develop	  a	  method	  for	  reproducing	  human	  cells	   in	  a	   laboratory.24	   	  The	  cell	   line	  derived	  from	  this	  research,	  “HeLa,”	  has	  had	  an	  enormous	  im-­‐pact	   in	   biomedicine,	   leading	   to	   the	   polio	   vaccine,	   cancer	   treatments,	  and	   new	  methods	   for	   in	   vitro	   fertilization.25	   	   Despite	   the	   substantial	  capital	  that	  has	  circulated	  due	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  HeLa	  cell	  line,	  the	  Lacks	   family	  has	  not	  shared	   in	   this	  wealth.	   	   Ironically,	   the	  clinical	  ap-­‐plications	   of	   HeLa	   are	   inaccessible	   to	   Henrietta’s	   surviving	   children,	  who	  cannot	  afford	  health	  insurance.26	  Subsequently,	  courts	  in	  multiple	  states	  have	  reaffirmed	  the	  denial	  of	  donors’	  property	  rights	  in	  their	  own	  tissue,	  and	  hence	  have	  prevent-­‐ed	  donors	  from	  sharing	  in	  any	  economic	  benefits	  from	  biotechnologies	  developed	   from	  samples	  of	   their	  genetic	  material.	   	  The	   legal	  doctrine	  originated	  in	  California,	  in	  Moore	  v.	  Regents	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Califor-­‐
nia.27	   	   The	   case	   began	   with	   John	   Moore’s	   treatment	   for	   leukemia	   at	  UCLA	  Hospital,	  over	  the	  course	  of	  which	  physicians	  removed	  his	  spleen	  and	  took	  samples	  of	  tissue	  and	  blood.	  	  The	  doctors	  did	  not	  disclose	  to	  Mr.	  Moore	   that	   his	   cells	  were	   unusual,	   nor	   that	   their	   use	   in	   research	  could	   lead	   to	   exciting—and	  potentially	  profitable—discoveries.28	   	  Re-­‐searchers	  used	   these	   cells	   to	   establish	   the	   “Mo”	   cell	   line,	   the	  value	  of	  which	  has	  been	  estimated	  in	  the	  billions	  of	  dollars.29	  Mr.	   Moore	   brought	   suit	   against	   his	   treating	   physicians	   and	   the	  hospital,	   alleging	   that	   the	   use	   of	   his	   cells	   in	   potentially	   lucrative	   re-­‐search	  constituted	  a	  conversion	  of	  his	  personal	  property,	  among	  other	  claims.30	  	  The	  California	  Supreme	  Court	  ultimately	  rejected	  Mr.	  Moore’s	  conversion	   claim,	   reasoning	   that	  Moore	   did	   not	   retain	   an	   ownership	  interest	  in	  his	  cells	  following	  their	  removal	  from	  his	  body.31	  	  Although	  
Moore	  is	  only	  binding	  precedent	  in	  California,	  the	  case	  has	  had	  a	  foun-­‐dational	  impact	  on	  how	  property	  rights	  in	  human	  genetic	  material	  are	  construed	   throughout	   the	   United	   States.	   	   Courts	   in	   other	   states	   have	  
	  	   24.	   	  Robin	  Feldman,	  Whose	  Body	  is	  it	  Anyway?	  Human	  Cells	  and	  the	  Strange	  Effects	  of	  Proper-­‐
ty	  and	  Intellectual	  Property	  Law,	  63	  STAN.	  L.	  REV.	  1377,	  1381	  (2011).	  	  	  	   25.	   	  See	  SKLOOT,	  supra	  note	  23,	  at	  3.	  	   26.	   	  See	   Robin	   McKie,	  Henrietta	   Lack’s	   Cells	   Were	   Priceless,	   But	   Her	   Family	   Can’t	   Afford	   a	  
Hospital,	   THE	   GUARDIAN	   (Apr.	   3,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/04/henrietta-­‐lacks-­‐cancer-­‐cells	   (last	   visited	   June	  4,	  2015).	  	   27.	   	  793	  P.2d	  479	  (Cal.	  1990).	  	   28.	   	  Id.	  at	  480–83.	  	   29.	   	  Feldman,	  supra	  note	  24,	  at	  1381.	  	   30.	   	  Moore	  initially	  stated	  thirteen	  causes	  of	  action,	  but	  only	  the	  breach	  of	  fiduciary	  duty	  and	  lack	   of	   informed	   consent,	   and	   the	   conversion	   claims	  made	   it	   to	   the	   California	   Supreme	   Court.	  
Moore,	  793	  P.2d	  	  at	  482.	  	   31.	   	  Id.	  at	  488–89.	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  reached	   similar	   conclusions,	   tending	   to	   value	   the	   inputs	   of	   medical	  research	  over	  the	  interests	  of	  research	  participants.32	  In	  Greenberg	  v.	  Miami	  Children’s	  Hospital	  Research	  Institute,	  Inc.,33	  a	  Florida	  federal	  district	  court	  rejected	  a	  conversion	  claim	  brought	  by	  tissue	   donors	   against	   a	   physician	   who	   received	   the	   donors’	   genetic	  materials,	  used	  them	  to	  isolate	  the	  gene	  causing	  Canavan	  disease,	  and	  then	   obtained	   a	   patent	   on	   the	   genetic	   sequence	   identified.34	   	   The	  
Greenberg	  court	   asserted	   that	   “Plaintiffs	  have	  no	   cognizable	  property	  interest	  in	  body	  tissue	  and	  genetic	  matter	  donated	  for	  research	  under	  a	  theory	  of	  conversion,”35	  cited	  Moore,	  and	  then	  went	  on	  to	  conclude	  that	  “limits	  to	  the	  property	  rights	  that	  attach	  to	  body	  tissue	  have	  been	  rec-­‐ognized	  in	  Florida	  state	  courts.”36	  Likewise,	   in	  Washington	  University	  v.	  Catalona,37	   the	  U.S.	  Court	  of	  Appeals	   for	   the	   Eighth	   Circuit	   upheld	   the	   district	   court’s	   finding	   that	  patients	  who	  were	  invited	  to	  participate	  in	  genetic	  research	  by	  provid-­‐ing	   tissue	   to	  a	  biorepository	  at	  Washington	  University	  were	   “donors”	  and	   that	   the	   samples	   collected	   were	   “inter-­‐vivos”	   gifts	   from	   the	   pa-­‐tients	   to	   the	   institution.38	   	   Critics	   have	   argued	   that	   the	   decisions	   in	  
Greenberg	   and	   Catalona	   are	   problematic	   because	   they	   confuse	   in-­‐formed	  consent	  with	  donation,	   failing	   to	   recognize	   that	   research	  par-­‐ticipants	   should	  not	   reasonably	  be	   expected	   to	  behave	   like	  donors	   in	  other	   situations,	   who	  might	   understand	   that	   they	   are	   engaged	   in	   an	  arms-­‐length	  negotiation.39	  These	   cases	   illustrate	   the	   “traditional	   assumption”	   that	   research	  participants	  who	  provide	  genetic	  material	  are	  donors,	  individuals	  who	  receive	  no	   financial	   compensation	   for	   their	  samples,	   receive	  no	  share	  of	   revenues	   from	   any	   commercial	   products	   resulting	   from	   research	  relying	  on	  their	  donated	  samples,	  have	  no	  patent	  rights	   to	  patentable	  discoveries	  that	  use	  their	  donated	  DNA,	  and	  have	  little	  or	  no	  say	  about	  what	   is	   done	   with	   their	   samples	   beyond	   whatever	   restrictions	   were	  included	  in	  their	   informed	  consent	  agreement.40	   	  This	  theory	  of	  prop-­‐	  	   32.	   	  See	  Gail	  Javitt,	  Why	  Not	  Take	  All	  of	  Me?	  Reflections	  on	  the	  Immortal	  Life	  of	  Henrietta	  Lacks	  
and	  the	  Status	  of	  Participants	   in	  Research	  Using	  Human	  Specimens,	  11	  MINN.	   J.L.	  SCI.	  &	  TECH.	  713,	  741	  (2010).	  	   33.	   	  264	  F.Supp.2d	  1064,	  1066	  (S.D.	  Fla.	  2003).	  	   34.	   	  Id.	  at	  1067.	  	   35.	   	  Id.	  at	  1074.	  	   36.	   	  Id.	  at	  1075.	  	   37.	   	  Washington	  University	  v.	  Catalona	  (Catalona	  II),	  490	  F.3d	  667,	  668	  (8th	  Cir.	  2007).	  	   38.	   	  Id.	  at	  673–74.	  	   39.	   	  Javitt,	  supra	  note	  32,	  at	  745.	  	   40.	   	  Gary	  E.	  Marchant,	  Property	  Rights	  and	  Benefit-­‐Sharing	  for	  DNA	  Donors?,	  45	  JURIMETRICS	  J.	  153,	  155	  (2005).	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  erty	  law—conceptualizing	  individuals	  who	  provide	  samples	  of	  genetic	  material	   for	   biomedical	   research	   or	   to	   biobanks	   as	   “donors”—could	  appropriately	   be	   termed	   the	   “Moore	  model.”	   	  While	   it	   currently	   em-­‐bodies	   the	  status	  quo	   for	  ownership	  of	  HGM	   in	   the	  United	  States,	   the	  Moore	   model	   is	   by	   no	   means	   the	   only	   way	   to	   understand	   property	  rights	  in	  the	  human	  body.	  III.	  WHO	  OWNS	  WHOM:	  PROPERTY	  RIGHTS	  FRAMEWORKS	  FOR	  HUMAN	  GENETIC	  MATERIAL	  The	  question	  of	  to	  whom	  property	  rights	  in	  human	  genetic	  mate-­‐rial	  should	  be	  granted	  has	  broader	   implications	  than	  the	  allocation	  of	  legal	  privileges	  and	  economic	  benefits,	  although	  such	  assignments	  are	  themselves	   tremendously	   impactful.	   	   More	   fundamental,	   though,	   are	  the	   various	   debates	   that	   the	   allocation	   of	   property	   rights	   in	   human	  DNA	  provokes.	   	   These	   areas	   of	   contention	  manifest	   diverse	   sociocul-­‐tural	   values,	   and	   implicate	   significant	   historical	   trends	   surrounding	  economic	   globalization	   and	   the	  worldwide	   encroachment	   of	  Western	  conceptualizations	   of	   property	   ownership.41	   	   The	   areas	   of	   debate—exclusion	  v.	  access;	  private	  v.	  public;	  altruism	  v.	  property;	  individual	  v.	  collective—are	  encapsulated	  in	  the	  various	  proposed	  models	  for	  own-­‐ership	  of	  human	  genetic	  material.	  	  However,	  each	  model	  assigns	  value	  differentially,	   and	   therefore	   the	   selection	   of	   one	   over	   the	   others	   has	  vast	   impact	   over	   the	   distribution	   of	   benefits,	   capital,	   and	   ultimately,	  power,	  in	  global	  society.	  
A.	  The	  American	  Status	  Quo:	  The	  Moore	  Model	  The	   precedent	   set	   by	  Moore	   and	   reaffirmed	   by	   subsequent	   case	  law	  constructs	  a	  donation	  model	  for	  research	  participation,	  which	  has	  been	   historically	   operative	   in	   the	  United	   States.	   	   This	   “traditional	   as-­‐sumption”42	  holds	  that	  research	  participants	  are	  donors	  of	  the	  biologi-­‐cal	  samples	  that	  they	  provide,	  and	  these	  individuals	  therefore	  waive	  all	  property	  rights	  as	   terms	  of	  participation	   in	  a	  study.	   	   Indeed,	   typically	  the	  terms	  of	  this	  waiver	  are	  made	  explicit.	  	  For	  instance,	  the	  informed	  consent	  form	  for	  Beth	  Israel	  Deaconess	  Medical	  Center	  in	  Boston	  con-­‐tains	  the	  following	  provision:	  	  	   41.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  Cynthia	  M.	  Ho,	  Biopiracy	  and	  Beyond:	  A	  Consideration	  of	  Socio-­‐Cultural	  Conflicts	  
with	  Global	  Patent	  Policies,	  39	  U.	  MICH.	   J.L.	  REFORM	  433,	  455–460	  (2006)	  (discussing	   the	  clash	  of	  values	  between	  the	  Western	  desire	  for	  strong	  patent	  rights	  for	  the	  promotion	  of	  innovation	  and	  alternative	  perspectives	  calling	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  traditional	  knowledge	  for,	  e.g.,	  spiritual	  and	  cultural	  reasons).	  	   42.	   	  Marchant,	  supra	  note	  40,	  at	  155.	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  also	  understand	  and	  agree	  that	  the	  tissue	  you	  donate	  as	  a	  partic-­‐ipant	   in	  this	  research	  program	  becomes	  the	  permanent	  property	  of	  the	   Beth	   Israel	   Deaconess	   Medical	   Center.	   	   Beth	   Israel	   Deaconess	  Medical	   Center	   has	   no	   program	   to	   compensate	   you	   in	   the	   event	  product	  testing	  or	  commercial	  development	  takes	  place.43	  The	   Moore	   model	   presumes	   that	   research	   participants	   agree	   to	  provide	   samples	   of	   their	   genetic	  material	   based	   on	   altruistic	  motiva-­‐tions.	  	  Thus,	  in	  Moore,	  the	  court’s	  majority	  had	  no	  difficulty	  in	  conclud-­‐ing	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  “clearly	  did	  not	  expect	  to	  retain	  possession	  of	  his	  cells	  following	  their	  removal,”	  and	  so	  retained	  no	  ownership	  interest	  in	  his	  genetic	  material	  after	  it	  was	  extracted	  from	  his	  body.44	  	  Additional-­‐ly,	   the	  Moore	  model	   is	  predicated	  on	   the	   furtherance	  of	  economic	  ra-­‐tionale—such	  as	   incentivization	  of	   innovation—rather	   than	  on	  public	  or	  collective	  rights.	  
B.	  The	  European	  Model:	  State	  Ownership	  The	   largest-­‐scale	   biobanks	   to	   date	   have	   been	   established	   in	   Eu-­‐rope,	   in	   addition	   to	   a	   limited	  number	   of	   other	   industrialized	  nations.	  	  Several	   countries	   or	   subnational	   units	   have	   established	   or	   are	   estab-­‐lishing	   large	   biobanks	   representing	   huge	   populations,	   including	   Aus-­‐tria,	   Estonia,	   France,	  Great	  Britain,	  Germany,	   Iceland,	   Lativa,	  Norway,	  Singapore,	  Sweden,	  and	  Quebec.45	  	  These	  government-­‐sponsored,	  pop-­‐ulation-­‐based	  biobanks	  have	  experimented	  with	  different	  schemes	  for	  ownership	  of	  the	  human	  genetic	  material	  that	  they	  contain.	  	  However,	  even	  where	   ownership	   of	   a	   population	   biobank	   database	   is	   partly	   or	  fully	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  private	  company,	  the	  rights	  to	  the	  “human	  mate-­‐rial”	  contained	  within	  these	  databases	  frequently	  remains	  in	  the	  public	  domain,	  vis	  a	  vis	  the	  state.46	  Thus,	   the	   European	  model	   differs	   from	   the	  Moore	  model	   in	   that	  ownership	  of	  HGM	  contained	  in	  European-­‐population	  biobanks	  is	  typi-­‐cally	  bifurcated,	   simultaneously	   allowing	   for	   individual	   and	   collective	  property	   rights.	   	   For	   instance,	   the	   U.K.	   Biobank	   has	   been	   lauded	   for	  “staking	  out	  a	  new	  imagination	  of	  the	  genomic	  biobank	  as	  a	  common-­‐	  	   43.	   	  Id.	  (citing	  Beth	  Israel-­‐Ardis	  Consent	  Form,	  at	  4).	  	   44.	   	  Moore,	   supra	   note	   27,	   at	   136–37;	  but	   see	  Moore,	   supra	   note	   27,	   at	   154	   (Broussard,	   J.,	  dissenting)	   (reframing	   the	   question	   for	   establishing	   a	   conversion	   claim	   as	   such:	   “the	   pertinent	  inquiry	   is	  not	  whether	  a	  patient	  generally	  retains	  an	  ownership	   interest	   in	  a	  body	  part	  after	   its	  removal	  from	  his	  body,	  but	  rather	  whether	  a	  patient	  has	  a	  right	  to	  determine,	  before	  a	  body	  part	  is	  removed,	  the	  use	  to	  which	  the	  part	  will	  be	  put	  after	  removal.”).	  	   45.	   	  Gottweis	  &	  Petersen,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  5;	  see	  also	  Mark	  A.	  Rothstein,	  Expanding	  the	  Ethical	  
Analysis	  of	  Biobanks,	  33	  J.L.	  MED.	  &	  ETHICS	  89,	  97	  (2005).	  	   46.	   	  Sarah	   Wilson,	   Population	   Biobanks	   and	   Social	   Justice:	   Commercial	   or	   Communitarian	  
Models?:	   A	   Comparative	   Analysis	   of	   Benefit	   Sharing,	   Ownership	   and	   Access	   Arrangements,	   8	  TRAMES	  80,	  86	  (2004).	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  pool	  resource.”47	  	  But	  the	  European	  model	  does	  not	  wholly	  depart	  from	  the	   theoretical	   underpinnings	   of	   the	  Moore	  model.	   	   Indeed,	   although	  the	   example	   of	   the	  U.K.	   Biobank	   is	   intriguing	   in	   that	   its	   contents	   are	  publicly	  owned,	  it	  still	  “emphasises	  the	  ownership	  and	  property	  rights	  of	  the	  research	  institution	  above	  that	  of	  the	  individual	  participants.”48	  	  While	  such	  a	  paradigm	  shifts	  the	  Moore	  model’s	  focus	  from	  exclusively	  private	   rights	   based	   on	   economic	   rationale,	   it	   may	   not	   fully	   assuage	  concerns	  over	  distributive	  justice.	  
C.	  The	  Free	  Market	  Model	  In	   contrast	   to	   the	   European	  model,	  which	   at	   least	   acknowledges	  the	  importance	  of	  collective	  property	  rights,	  some	  have	  proposed	  that	  privatization	   should	   go	   even	   further	   than	   conceived	   of	   in	   the	  Moore	  paradigm.	   	  These	  proposals	  call	   for	  an	  open	  market	   in	  which	  all	   indi-­‐viduals	  would	   enjoy	   the	   ability	   to	   sell	   their	   own	   genetic	  materials	   to	  the	  highest	  bidder.	  	  The	  market	  model	  would	  presume	  that	  “any	  valua-­‐ble	  object	  will	  be	  more	  efficiently	  distributed	  through	  a	  series	  of	  volun-­‐tary	  market	  transactions	  than	  through	  other	  allocation	  systems.	  	  Thus,	  the	   information	   encoded	   in	   an	   individual’s	   genome	   should	   be	   ex-­‐changeable	  through	  the	  free	  market.”49	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  understand-­‐ing	   of	   biomedical	   research	   subjects	   as	   donors,	   market	   theory	  conceptualizes	   participants	   as	   competitors	   in	   an	   economic	   sphere	   in	  which	  human	  genetic	  material	  is	  a	  valuable	  commodity.	  Although	   it	   perpetuates	   the	   dominant	  Western	   value	   system	   for	  property	  ownership,	   the	   free	  market	  approach	  could	  entail	  many	  dis-­‐tributive	  advantages.	  	  Unlike	  the	  European	  model,	  a	  free	  market	  could	  facilitate	   benefit	   sharing,	   potentially	   increase	   the	   supply	   of	   available	  donors,	   and	   augment	  public	   confidence	   in	   genetic	   research.50	   	   Yet,	   fi-­‐nancially	  compensating	  all	  donors	  could	  implicate	  ethical	  and	  practical	  problems,	  such	  as	  inappropriate	  inducement	  to	  participate	  in	  research,	  and	   determining	   the	   fair	   market	   value	   of	   human	   biological	   speci-­‐mens.51	   	  Additionally,	   the	  free	  market	  approach	  may	  not	  be	  appropri-­‐	  	   47.	   	  Winickoff,	  supra	  note	  4,	  at	  441.	  	   48.	   	  Wilson,	  supra	  note	  46,	  at	  86.	  	   49.	   	  Catherine	  M.	  Valerio	  Barrad,	  Genetic	  Information	  and	  Property	  Theory,	  87	  NW.	  U.	  L.	  REV.	  1037,	  1081	  (1993).	  	   50.	   	  Marchant,	  supra	  note	  40,	  at	  169.	  	   51.	   	  Id.	  at	  169–70;	  but	  see	  Marshall	  B.	  Kapp,	  A	  Legal	  Approach	  to	  the	  Use	  of	  Human	  Biological	  
Materials	   for	  Research	  Purposes,	  10	  RUTGERS	   J.	  L.	  &	  PUB.	  POL’Y	  1,	  26	  (2013)	  (discussing	  proposals	  for	  Genetic	  Bills	  of	  Rights	  that	  have	  been	  introduced	  in	  Massachusetts	  and	  Vermont,	  which	  would	  recognize	  that	  human	  biological	  material	  has	  a	   fair	  market	  value.	  Such	   legislation	  could	  make	  it	  easier	  to	  determine	  what	  this	  value	  should	  be).	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  for	  many	  countries	  whose	  social	  and	  economic	  values	  do	  not	  align	  well	  with	  neoliberal	  economic	  theory.	  
D.	  Open	  Access	  Models	  A	   less	   extreme	  approach	   is	   embodied	   in	  models	   that	  would	  pro-­‐vide	   for	   open	   access	   to	   biobanked	   information.	   	   Open	   access	  models	  may	  retain	  the	  basic	  Moore	  framework;	  however,	  they	  also	  emphasize	  the	   importance	   of,	   at	   least,	   allowing	   for	   open,	   unrestricted	   access	   to	  data	  generated	  by	  research	  that	  has	  utilized	  donated	  DNA.	  	  To	  promote	  distributive	  justice,	  open	  access,	  coupled	  with	  enhanced	  informed	  con-­‐sent	   protocols,	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   the	   minimum	   benefit	   to	   which	  donors	   are	   entitled,	   since	   “[a]ccess	   constraints	   on	   patented	   ‘health	  technologies’—medicines,	   diagnostic	   agents,	   and	   agricultural	   innova-­‐tions—may	  severely	  compromise	  human	  well-­‐being.”52	  Providing	   rapid	   and	   unrestricted	   access	   to	   the	   research	   data	   ac-­‐crued	   by	   large-­‐scale	   biobanks	   is	   a	   form	   of	   “benefit	   sharing.”53	   	   This	  concept	   advocates	   for	   the	   creation	   of	  mechanisms	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	  advantages	   stemming	   from	   genomic	   research	   are	   enjoyed	   by	   whole	  population	  groups,	  rather	  than	  by	  researchers	  or	  their	  host	  institutions	  alone.54	   	   The	   sharing	   of	   benefits	   derived	   from	   research	  with	   donated	  human	   genetic	  materials	   has	   been	   frequently	   recognized	   as	   a	  means	  for	  the	  advancement	  of	  distributive	  justice.55	  	  Open	  access	  models	  can	  promote	   the	  well-­‐being	  of	   the	   individuals	  and	  communities	  on	  which	  scientific	   progress	   relies,	   by	   simultaneously	   preventing	   “parasite	   pa-­‐tenting	  of	  primary	  data,”	  and	  by	  promoting	  quick	  and	  efficient	  dissem-­‐ination	   of	   research	   results,	   even	   if	   donors	   of	   HGM	   are	   not	   actually	  recognized	  as	  rights	  holders.56	  The	   intersection	   of	   distributive	   justice	   and	   open	   access	   to	   re-­‐search	   results	   implicates	  not	   only	   theoretical	   questions	  of	   ownership	  of	  human	  genetic	  material,	  but	  also	  the	  parameters	  of	  international	  IP	  	  	   52.	   	  Peter	   Lee,	   Toward	   a	   Distributive	   Commons	   in	   Patent	   Law,	   2009	  WIS.	   L.	   REV.	   917,	   919	  (2009).	  	   53.	   	  Yann	   Joly,	   Clarissa	   Allen	   &	   Bartha	   M.	   Knoppers,	   Open	   Access	   as	   Benefit	   Sharing?	   The	  
Example	  of	  Publicly	  Funded	  Large-­‐Scale	  Genomic	  Databases,	  40	  J.L.	  MED.	  &	  ETHICS	  143,	  143	  (2012).	  	   54.	   	  Id.	  	   55.	   	  See	   Lori	   B.	   Andrews,	  Harnessing	   the	   Benefits	   of	   Biobanks,	   33	   J.L.	  MED.	   &	   ETHICS	   22,	   27	  (2005).	  	   56.	   	  Joly,	   et	   al.,	   supra	   note	   53.	   	   Notably,	   some	   authors	   have	   argued	   that	   current	   open	   ac-­‐cess/open	  source	  models	  do	  not	  adequately	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  parasitic	  patenting.	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  Donna	  M.	   Gitter,	  Resolving	   the	   Open	   Source	   Paradox	   in	   Biotechnology:	   A	   Proposal	   for	   a	   Revised	  
Open	   Source	   Policy	   for	   Publicly	   Funded	   Genomic	   Databases,	   43	   HOUS.	   L.	   REV.	   1475,	   1492	   (2007)	  (proposing	   that	   “creators	  of	   future	   large-­‐scale,	  publicly	   funded	  genomic	  databases	  ought	   to	   im-­‐plement	  a	  nonexclusive,	  nonroyalty-­‐bearing	  licensing	  policy	  for	  [biobanked]	  data.”).	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  law	   regimes.	   	   The	   American	   patent	   system	   values	   strong	   individual	  property	   rights	   and	   private	   ordering	   of	   ownership,	   and	   these	   values	  have	   been	   internationalized	   through	  multilateral	   agreements	   such	   as	  the	   1992	   Trade	   Related	   Aspects	   of	   Intellectual	   Property	   Agreement	  (TRIPS).57	   	   However,	   it	   is	   interesting	   to	   consider	   how	   “distributive	  safeguards”	   might	   be	   integrated	   into	   this	   paradigm,	   thus	   enhancing	  access	  to	  patented	  health	  technologies	  for	  low-­‐income	  and	  other	  mar-­‐ginalized	  populations.58	  For	   instance,	   it	   has	   been	   proposed	   that	   the	   public	   institutions	  which	   contribute	   large	   amounts	   of	   “scientific	   capital”	   —i.e.,	   money,	  labor,	  and	  bodily	  materials—to	  life	  sciences	  research	  are	  uniquely	  po-­‐sitioned	   to	   create	   a	   “distributive	   commons”	   for	  patented	  health	   tech-­‐nologies.59	   	   Legally,	   this	   shared	   ownership	   structure	   could	  conceptually	  resemble	  a	  public-­‐private	  tenancy	  in	  common,	  combining	  the	  productive	  power	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  with	  publicly-­‐oriented	  dis-­‐tributive	  safeguards.60	  	  Since	  both	  public	  and	  private	  institutions	  have	  legitimate	  claims	  to	  patented	  health	  technologies,61	  a	  legal	  framework	  granting	   shared	   ownership	   over	   the	   downstream	   uses	   of	   these	   tech-­‐nologies	  would	   be	   reasonable	   and	   appropriate.	   	   By	   recognizing	   open	  access	  to	  biobanked	  data,	  advantages	  of	  the	  current	  patent	  law	  scheme	  could	  be	  retained,	  while	  communitarian	  well-­‐being	  could	  be	  enhanced.	  
	  
E.	  Quasi-­‐	  /	  Semi-­‐Patents	  Models	  	  Similarly,	  another	  potential	  means	  to	  achieve	  benefit-­‐sharing	  ends	  on	   a	   broad,	   system-­‐wide	   scale	   could	   entail	  modifying	   extant	   interna-­‐tional	   legal	   framework	   for	   patent	   eligibility	   by	   limiting	   the	   ability	   of	  researchers	   to	   obtain	   protections	   for	   biotechnologies	   derived	   from	  HGM.	   	   One	   proposal	   for	   patent	   law	   reform	   would	   incorporate	   two	  ownership	  models	  for	  the	  contents	  of	  biobanks,	  distinguishing	  human	  genetic	   specimens	   from	   the	   annotative	   information	   associated	   there-­‐
	  	   57.	   	  Sabrina	  Safrin,	  Hyperownership	  in	  a	  Time	  of	  Biotechnological	  Promise:	  The	  International	  
Conflict	   to	   Control	   the	  Building	  Blocks	   of	   Life,	   98	  AM.	   J.	   INT’L	   L.	   641,	   643	   (2004)	   (noting	   that	   the	  United	   States	   assumed	   the	   leadership	   role	   in	   pressing	   for	   the	   adoption	   of	   TRIPS	   and	   that	   the	  agreement	  requires	  countries	  to	  extend	  patent	  protection	  to	  bioengineered	  goods	  with	  the	  poten-­‐tial	  imposition	  of	  trade	  sanctions	  if	  they	  do	  not	  comply).	  	  	   58.	   	  See	  Lee,	  supra	  note	  52	  at	  1014.	  	   59.	   	  Id.	  at	  918.	  	   60.	   	  Id.	  at	  926–27.	  	   61.	   	  Id.	  at	  1014.	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  with.62	   	   According	   to	   this	   approach,	   biobanked	   tissue	   would	   still	   be	  technically	  owned	  by	  the	  entity	  responsible	  for	  maintaining	  the	  tissue	  and	  the	  database.63	  However,	   this	   entity	  would	   enjoy	   rights	   to	   only	   a	   few	   “sticks”	   in	  the	   rhetorical	   “bundle.”	   	   In	   contrast	   to	   the	   Moore	   model,	   biobanks	  would	   exist	   in	   a	   semicommons,	   in	  which	  member	   researchers	  would	  have	  access	  to	  all	  relevant	  tissue	  and	  datasets	  to	  enable	  efficiency	  and	  effectiveness.64	   	  Meanwhile,	   tissue	   information	  would	  be	  situated	  as	  a	  “pure	   commons”	   within	   the	   biobanking	   semicommons,	   with	   de-­‐identified	   information	   available	   to	   all	  members	   of	   the	   semicommons,	  including	  researchers	  and	  tissue	  donors.65	  	  Thus,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  imag-­‐ining	  biobanks	  as	  operating	  within	  a	  liberal	  semicommons	  would	  allow	  more	  benefits	  to	  inure	  to	  tissue	  donors,	  without	  drastically	  altering	  the	  extant	   patent	   law	   frameworks.	   	   Yet,	   even	   if	   construed	   as	   a	   semicom-­‐mons,	   it	   is	  unlikely	   that	   the	   information-­‐access	  benefits	   that	   research	  donors	  would	  enjoy	  would	  fully	  address	  distributive	  justice	  concerns.	  
F.	  Economic	  Benefit	  Sharing	  Models	  Ultimately,	   the	  need	   to	  achieve	  distributive	   justice	   in	   the	  context	  of	   biobanking	   demands	   more	   than	   access	   to	   information,	   although	  such	   transparency	  would	   indeed	   be	   an	   improvement	   over	   the	   status	  quo	   in	   the	  United	  States.	   	  Multiple	   ideas	  about	  how	   to	   share	   the	  eco-­‐nomic	   benefits	   of	   biotechnologies	   developed	   from	   donated	   genetic	  materials	   have	   been	   advanced.	   	   Yet	   there	   is	   little	   agreement	   about	  which	  model	  would	  be	  most	  feasible.	   	  Furthermore,	  many	  critics	  have	  voiced	  caution	  over	  the	  possibility	  of	  “undue	   inducement;”	   the	  notion	  that	   individuals	   might	   be	   inappropriately	   lured	   to	   participate	   in	   re-­‐search	   if	   they	   are	   offered	   direct,	   financial	   returns	   on	   their	   involve-­‐ment.66	   	   But	   the	   accuracy	   of	   such	   concerns	   may	   be	   increasingly	  questioned,	   as	   “[r]esearch	   participants’	   constitutive	   exclusion	   from	  access	   to	   the	   vast	   profits	   that	   accrue	   to	   researchers	   and	   companies	  is	  .	  .	  .	  growing	   difficult	   to	   defend	   and	   describe	   in	   conventional	   ethical	  languages	  of	  gift	  and	  a	  diffuse	  public	  good.”67	  	  	   62.	   	  Ken	  Gatter,	  Biobanks	  as	  a	  Tissue	  and	  Information	  Semicommons:	  Balancing	  Interests	   for	  
Personalized	  Medicine,	  Tissue	  Donors	  and	  the	  Public	  Health,	  15	  J.	  HEALTH	  CARE	  L.	  &	  POL’Y	  303,	  335	  (2012).	  	   63.	   	  Id.	  at	  341.	  	   64.	   	  Id.	  	   65.	   	  Id.	  at	  342.	  	   66.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  Cori	  Hayden,	  Taking	  as	  Giving:	  Bioscience,	  Exchange,	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Benefit-­‐
Sharing,	  37	  SOCIAL	  STUDIES	  OF	  SCI.	  729,	  739	  (2007).	  	   67.	   	  Id.	  at	  740.	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  Yet,	   even	   if	   frameworks	   for	   economic	   benefit	   sharing	   are	   to	   be	  considered	   for	   implementation,	   it	   remains	   unclear	  which	  would	   best	  serve	   the	   ends	   of	   capitalism	   and	   distributive	   justice	   simultaneously.	  	  Proposals	  have	  included	  the	  idea	  of	  royalty-­‐distribution,68	  or	  the	  issu-­‐ance	   of	   a	   single	   share	   of	   “subject-­‐class”	   stock	   in	   any	   tied-­‐in	   biotech	  venture	  to	  all	  participants	  in	  a	  research	  trial.69	  	  Others	  have	  discussed	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  “direct	  negotiation”	  model,70	  in	  the	  context	  of	  fos-­‐tering	  joint	  ventures	  based	  on	  contract	  law	  between	  biobanks	  and	  tis-­‐sue	  donors.71	  Importantly,	  these	  myriad	  proposals	  for	  economic	  benefit	  sharing	  operate	   in	   terms	   of	   equity,	   “definitively	   stop[ping]	   short	   of	   offering	  property	  rights	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  benefit	  itself.”72	  	  Therefore,	  benefit	  sharing	  frameworks	  typically	  avoid	  any	  discussion	  of	  potential	  participation	  by	  tissue	  donors	  in	  a	  market	  for	  their	  biological	  specimens.	  
G.	  Hybrid	  Models:	  Proposals	  for	  Comprehensive	  Reform	  Perhaps	   the	  most	   pragmatic	   yet	   radical	   proposals	   for	   reforming	  property	  law	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  ownership	  of	  human	  genetic	  material	  are	   those	   which	   have	   attempted	   to	   strike	   a	   more	   equitable	   balance	  between	   the	   interests	   of	   various	   stakeholders.	   	   Such	   approaches	   are	  based	  on	  the	  argument	  that	  “[n]either	  the	  Moore-­‐based	  donation	  para-­‐digm	   nor	   the	   market-­‐based	   alternative	   is	   sufficiently	   satisfactory	   to	  quiet	   professional	   and	   social	   concerns.”73	   	   Additionally,	   these	   hybrid	  models	  attempt	  to	  go	  beyond	  approaches	  for	  open	  access	  or	  economic	  	  	   68.	   	  See,	   e.g.,	   Jon	   F.	   Merz	   et	   al.,	  Protecting	   Subjects’	   Interests	   in	   Genetic	   Research,	  70	   AM.	   J.	  HUMAN	  GENETICS	  965,	  968–69	  (2002).	  	  The	  authors	  state	  that	  “[e]ntities	  involved	  in	  the	  commercial	  aspects	   of	   research	   (including	   companies	   and	   universities	   that	   develop	   intellectual	   property	  portfolios	  from	  which	  royalty	  revenues	  can	  be	  earned)	  should	  be	  expected,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  public	  policy	  and	  research	  ethics	  practice,	  to	  openly	  negotiate	  with	  foundations	  and	  disease-­‐associated	  advocacy	  group	  [sic]	  and	  to	  resolve	  issues	  regarding	  ownership	  control	  of	  downstream	  use,	  limits	  on	  financial	  profit-­‐taking	  from	  inventions,	  equitable	  profit	  sharing,	  and	  other	  acknowledgements	  of	  all	  contributions	  before	  the	  research	  is	  done.	  	  Id.	  at	  970.	  	   69.	   	  Hayden,	  supra	  note	  66,	  at	  742.	  	   70.	   	  The	  direct	   negotiation	  model	   is	   best	   exemplified	  by	   the	  work	  of	   the	   organization	  PXE	  International.	   	  As	  an	  advocacy	  group	   for	   individuals	  with	  pseudoxanthoma	  elasticum	  (“PXE”),	  a	  rare	  connective	  tissue	  disorder,	  the	  organization	  recruits	  researchers,	  but	  only	  those	  who	  agree	  to	  abide	  by	  PXE’s	  terms.	  The	  terms	  of	  these	  contracts	  provide	  that	  PXE	  International	  will	  enjoy	  co-­‐ownership	  of	  any	  patent	  that	  ensues	  from	  study	  of	  the	  tissues	  that	  the	  biobank	  provides.	  Organi-­‐zational	   decisionmaking	   is	   guided	   by	   patients	   and	   the	   relatives	   of	   patients,	   who	   represent	   the	  population	   with	   the	   largest	   stake	   in	   locating	   therapies	   and	   cures.	   	   PXE	   INTERNATIONAL,	  http://www.pxe.org	  (last	  visited	  June	  4,	  2015).	  	   71.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  Andrews,	  supra	  note	  55,	  at	  27.	  	   72.	   	  Hayden,	  supra	  note	  66,	  at	  743.	  	   73.	   	  Charlotte	  H.	  Harrison,	  Neither	  Moore	  Nor	  the	  Market:	  Alternative	  Models	  for	  Compensat-­‐
ing	  Contributors	  of	  Human	  Tissue,	  23	  AM.	  J.L.	  &	  MED.	  77,	  78	  (2002).	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   sharing,	   by	   allocating	   rights	   in	   HGM	   to	   biomedical	   research	  donors.	  Following	  this	  logic,	  Harrison	  proposes	  a	  model	  that	  would	  main-­‐tain	  a	  general	  rule	  of	  donation	   for	  HGM	  at	   the	   time	   it	   is	  acquired	  and	  provide	   an	   objective,	   non-­‐market	  mechanism	   for	   compensation	   after	  research	  use	  for	  unusual	  cases	  in	  which	  samples	  prove	  to	  have	  signifi-­‐cant	  commercial	  utility,	  and	  thereby	  the	  potential	  to	  generate	  substan-­‐tial	   profits.74	   	   The	   “objective,	   non-­‐market	   mechanism”	   that	   Harrison	  proposes	   would	   be	   a	   statutorily-­‐established	   compensation	   tribunal	  that	  would	   “use	  statutory	  standards	   to	  calculate	   the	  measure	  of	  com-­‐pensation	   to	   be	   paid”	   to	   a	   donor	   if	   and	   when	   her	   tissues	   are	   deter-­‐mined	  to	  have	  exceptional	  market	  value.75	  Alternatively,	  Boyle	  proposes	  a	  “trust	  system”	  which	  would	  offer	  a	  mechanism	  to	  promote	  altruism	  while	  allowing	  compensation	  for	  spe-­‐cific	   individuals	   who	   contribute	   a	   “great	   deal”	   to	   a	   research	   study.76	  	  Boyle’s	  model	  would	   confer	   a	   property	   interest	   to	   individual	   donors,	  which	   would	   be	   granted	   by	   a	   governmental	   commission	   that	   would	  create	  an	  inter	  vivos	  trust,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  donation,	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  do-­‐nee,	   “in	   case	   his	   tissue	   has	   significant	   commercial	   value	   in	   the	   fu-­‐ture.”77	  	  In	  contrast,	  Winickoff	  and	  Winickoff’s	  “charitable	  trust”	  model	  would	  position	  the	  biobank	  as	  a	  trust	  with	  the	  public	  as	  the	  beneficiary	  and	  the	  biobank’s	  managers	  as	   trustees,	  who	  would	  assume	  all	  of	   the	  legal	  obligations	  that	  such	  a	  position	  entails.78	  Alternatively,	  Gitter	  argues	  that	  research	  participants	  should	  have	  the	   opportunity	   to	   bargain	   with	   researchers	   autonomously.79	   	   Thus,	  Gitter	   proposes	   that	   “Congress	   enact	   legislation	  permitting	   and	   regu-­‐lating	  the	  sale	  of	  human	  tissue	  used	  for	  research	  purposes,	  and	  estab-­‐lish	   a	   tort	   of	   conversion	   in	   the	   event	   that	   a	   scientific	   researcher	  wrongfully	  exercises	  dominion	  over	  a	   research	  participant’s	   tissue.”80	  	  	  	   74.	   	  Id.	  at	  79.	  	   75.	   	  Id.	  at	  97.	  	   76.	   	  Joyce	  Boyle,	  To	  Pay	  or	  Not	  to	  Pay,	  That	  is	  the	  Question:	  Finding	  an	  Intermediary	  Solution	  
Along	  the	  Moore	  Spectrum,	  7	  MICH.	  ST.	  U.	  J.	  MED.	  &	  L.	  55,	  74	  (2002).	  	   77.	   	  Id.	  at	  75.	  	   78.	   	  David	  E.	  Winickoff	  &	  Richard	  N.	  Winickoff,	  The	  Charitable	  Trust	  as	  a	  Model	  for	  Genomic	  
Biobanks,	   349	  NEW	  ENGLAND	   J.	  MED.	  1180,	  1182	   (2003);	   See	  also	  David	  E.	  Winickoff	  &	  Larissa	  B.	  Neumann,	  Towards	  a	  Social	  Contract	  for	  Genomics:	  Property	  and	  the	  Public	  in	  the	  ‘Biotrust’	  Model,	  3	  GEONOMICS,	  SOC.	  &	  POL’Y	  8,	  8	  (2005)	  (attempting	  to	  clarify	  how	  “thorny	  questions	  around	  proper-­‐ty	  rights,	  the	  right	  to	  withdraw	  from	  research,	  access	  to	  materials,	  and	  funding	  might	  be	  handled	  within	  .	  .	  .	  a	  charitable	  trust	  structure”).	  	   79.	   	  Donna	  M.	  Gitter,	  Ownership	  of	  Human	  Tissue:	  A	  Proposal	   for	  Federal	  Recognition	  of	  Hu-­‐
man	  Research	  Participants’	  Property	  Rights	  in	  Their	  Biological	  Material,	  61	  WASH.	  &	  LEE	  L.	  REV.	  257,	  270	  (2004).	  	   80.	   	  Id.	  at	  268.	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  Finally,	  Conley	  et	  al.	  turn	  away	  from	  the	  historical	  language	  of	  the	  law	  of	   tangible	   property	   and	   trusts	   to	   propose	   a	   trade	   secret	   model	   for	  genomic	  biobanking.81	  	  The	  Conley	  model	  authors	  conducted	  a	  study	  in	  which	   participants	   tended	   to	   describe	   their	   DNA	   in	   ways	   that	   were	  reminiscent	   of	   the	   legal	   definition	  of	   a	   trade	   secret.82	   	  Hence,	   the	   au-­‐thors	   propose	   a	   biobank-­‐participant	   contract,	   under	   which	   partici-­‐pants’	  rights	  and	  researchers’	  obligations	  would	  be	  defined	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis,	  with	  the	  resulting	  agreement	  enforceable	  by	  courts.83	  Although	   each	   of	   these	   alternative	   frameworks	   for	   ownership	   of	  human	  genetic	  material	  has	  merit,	  none	  should	  be	  implemented	  until	  a	  fundamental	  prerequisite	  is	  met.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  ownership	  debate	  should	  first	  be	  broadly	  reframed	  in	  terms	  of	  distributive	  justice.	  	  As	  Marchant	  has	  noted	  in	  calling	  for	  a	  “new	  ethic”	  of	  genetic	  donation,	  “[w]e	  will	  all	  (hopefully)	   share	   in	   the	   ultimate	   benefits	   of	   genetic	   research,	   and	  therefore	   it	  may	  only	  be	   fair	   that	  we	   all	   do	  our	  part	   in	  making	   those	  benefits	  possible.”84	  	  While	  I	  agree	  that	  a	  “new	  ethic”	  is	  required	  before	  reforming	  the	  legal	  framework	  of	  human	  DNA	  ownership,	  I	  believe	  that	  Marchant’s	   proposal	   misses	   the	   mark.	   	   Rather	   than	   shifting	   societal	  value	  toward	  augmented	  altruism,	  focusing	  on	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  indi-­‐vidual	  participant,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  biosociality85	  should	  be	  reformulated.	  	  Under	  such	  a	  re-­‐valuation,	  the	  benefits	  of	  biomedical	  research	   would,	   in	   part,	   inure	   to	   groups.	   	   Property	   rights	   in	   human	  genetic	  material	  would	  be	  re-­‐imagined,	  collectivized.86	  IV.	  AN	  ARGUMENT	  FOR	  DISTRIBUTIVE	  JUSTICE	  Distributive	   justice	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   “normative	   principle	  favoring	   equality	   of	   access	   in	   resource	   allocation”	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	  “more	   commonplace	   utilitarian	   objective	   of	   allocating	   resources	   to	  maximize	  aggregate	  welfare.”87	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  biobanking,	  distribu-­‐tive	   justice	   refers	   to	   a	   systematic	   concern	   for	   ensuring	   access	   to	   the	  	  	   81.	   	  John	  M.	  Conley	  et	  al.,	  A	  Trade	  Secret	  Model	  for	  Genomic	  Biobanking,	  40	  J.L.	  MED.	  &	  ETHICS	  612,	  613	  (2012).	  	   82.	   	  Id.	  at	  614.	  	   83.	   	  Id.	  at	  623.	  	   84.	   	  Marchant,	  supra	  note	  40,	  at	  173.	  	   85.	   	  “Biosociality”	  refers	   to	   forms	  of	  collective	  action	   that	  arise	   in	  relation	   to	   the	  biological	  self.	  	  Mark	  L.	  Flear,	  “Together	  for	  Health”?	  How	  EU	  Governance	  of	  Health	  Undermines	  Active	  Biolog-­‐
ical	  Citizenship,	  26	  WIS.	  INT’L	  L.J.	  868,	  n.5	  (2008).	  	   86.	   	  The	  “collectivization”	  of	  the	  research	  subject	  refers	  to	  discussions	  “in	  which	  the	  notion	  of	  community	  as	  a	  protectable	  collective	  has	  been	  ricocheting	  vigorously	  between	  the	  aboriginal	  and	   the	   associational,	   the	   conceptual	   spaces	   of	   the	   fourth	   and	   first	   worlds,	   ethnic	   groups	   and	  patient	  groups,	  nations	  and	  families.”	  	  Hayden,	  supra	  note	  66,	  at	  744.	  	   87.	   	  Lee,	  supra	  note	  52,	  at	  921.	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  resources	   generated	   by	   biotechnology	   to	   those	   who	   cannot	   afford	  market	  prices.88	  	  The	  story	  of	  Henrietta	  Lacks	  offers	  an	  example	  of	  the	  dearth	  of	  distributive	  justice	  in	  the	  United	  States’	  model	  for	  ownership	  of	  human	  genetic	  material.	   	  As	  discussed	   in	  Part	   II	  of	   this	  Article,	  alt-­‐hough	   the	   HeLa	   cell	   line	   has	   generated	   billions	   of	   dollars	   in	   profits,	  Lacks’	  family	  is	  still	  too	  poor	  to	  afford	  health	  insurance.89	  	  Thus,	  if	  one	  of	   Lacks’	   children	   or	   grandchildren	   suffered	   from	   a	   condition	   that	  could	  be	  treated	  through	  a	  HeLa	  product,	  she	  would	  likely	  not	  be	  able	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  it,	  unable	  to	  pay	  the	  market	  price.	  	  Distributive	  justice	  seeks	  to	  redress	  this	  unfortunate	  irony.	  In	  order	  to	  begin	  to	  realize	  distributive	  justice	  in	  the	  context	  of	  bi-­‐otechnological	   development,	   we	   must	   question	   the	   Western	   notion	  that	  the	  rights	  associated	  with	  property	  ownership	  are	  vested	  primari-­‐ly	   in	   private	   individuals.	   	   Instead,	   we	  might	   imagine	   that	   for	   certain	  forms	  of	  property,	  models	  of	  ownership	  which	  locate	  rights	  in	  groups	  or	   collectives	   would	   be	  more	   appropriate.	   	   Human	   genetic	  materials	  may	  be	  considered	  one	  form	  of	  collective	  or	  shared	  property,	  since	  no	  individual	  person	  possesses	  genetic	  material	  entirely	  distinct	  from	  that	  of	  other	  people	  in,	  for	  example,	  his	  family.90	  Furthermore,	  inapposite	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  research	  subjects	  as	  autonomous	  individuals,	  “due	  to	  the	  (shared)	  nature	  of	  genetic	  ma-­‐terial	   and	   the	   information	   it	   provides,	   families,	   disease	   communities,	  populations	  or	  ‘ethnic	  groups’,	  and	  even	  entire	  nations	  .	  .	  .	  are	  the	  sub-­‐jects	  of	  genetics	  research.”91	  	  Indeed,	  the	  Western	  paradigm	  for	  owner-­‐ship	  of	  human	  genetic	  material	  ignores	  almost	  entirely	  the	  groups	  that	  exist	  between	  the	  national	  governments	  that	  regulate	  research	  and	  the	  individuals	   who	   participate	   in	   research	   studies.92	   	   Ironically,	   though,	  research	  in	  human	  genetics	  is	  actually	  about	  these	  “groups	  between”—ethnic	  groups,	  disease	  organizations,	  and	  families.	  	  Yet	  the	  extant	  legal	  framework	  –	  at	   least	   in	  the	  United	  States	  –	  gives	  these	  groups	  no	  for-­‐mal	  direction	  over	  research	  studies	  about	  them.93	  
	  	   88.	   	  Id.	  	   89.	   	  See	  McKie,	  supra	  note	  26.	  	   90.	   	  Natalie	  Ram,	  Assigning	  Rights	  and	  Protecting	  Interests:	  Constructing	  Ethical	  and	  Efficient	  
Legal	   Rights	   in	   Human	   Tissue	   Research,	   23	   HARV.	   J.L.	   &	   TECH.	   119,	   132	   (2009)	   (noting	   that	   the	  “shared	   nature	   of	   genetic	   information	   may	   necessitate	   new	   procedures	   for	   obtaining	   familial	  consent	   for	  public	  disclosure	  of	  genetic	   information”	  since	   family	  members	  also	  have	  a	  stake	   in	  the	  confidentiality	  of	  the	  samples	  provided	  by	  consenting	  tissue	  donors).	  	   91.	   	  Hayden,	  supra	  note	  66,	  at	  744.	  	   92.	   	  Henry	   T.	   Greely,	   The	   Control	   of	   Genetic	   Research:	   Involving	   the	   “Groups	   Between”,	   33	  HOUS.	  L.	  REV.	  1397,	  1398	  (1997).	  	   93.	   	  Id.	  at	  1398–99.	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  Nevertheless,	  some	  have	  proposed	  that	  biobanking—even	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  current	  governance	  structures—could	  be	   leveraged	  to	  empower	   population	   groups	   who	   have	   been	   excluded	   from	   the	   ge-­‐nomics	   revolution.94	   	   These	   groups—termed	   “health	   care	   have-­‐nots”	  (“HCHNs”)—include	  those	  without	  economic	  means	  or	  a	  loud	  political	  voice,	   who	   have	   been	   traditionally	   marginalized	   in	   clinical	   research,	  such	  as	  children,	  women,	  and	  many	  minority	  groups.95	  	  Several	  strate-­‐gies	  could	  currently	  be	  employed	  to	  share	  benefits	  with	  populations	  of	  HCHNs,	  ranging	  from	  specific	  technology	  transfer	  arrangements	  to	  the	  generalized	  channeling	  of	  revenue	  into	  public	  health	  basic	  needs	  such	  as	  vaccines,	  clean	  water,	  and	  sanitation.96	  Yet,	   the	  most	   fundamental	   need	   is	   to	   recognize	   that	   rather	   than	  individual	  research	  participants,	  these	  groups—the	  HCHNs,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  groups	  between,	  such	  as	  disease	  organizations—should	  be	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  distributive	  justice	  proposals.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  “it	  is	  communi-­‐ties	  or	   groups	   (even	  populations	   and	  nations)	   rather	   than	   individuals	  that	  serve	  as	  the	  viable	  subjects	  of	  benefit-­‐sharing.”97	  V.	  REDEFINING	  HUMAN	  GENETIC	  PROPERTY	  IN	  THE	  CONTEXT	  OF	  DISTRIBUTIVE	  JUSTICE	  In	  order	  to	  maximize	  distributive	  justice	  in	  the	  context	  of	  biobank-­‐ing,	   thereby	   promoting	   enhanced	   equality	   in	   access	   to	   the	   fruits	   of	  health	  technologies,	  the	  ownership	  debate	  must	  be	  reframed	  in	  collec-­‐tive,	  rather	  than	  individual,	  terms.	  	  Implicit	  in	  this	  reconceptualization	  is	   the	   recognition	   that	   groups	   of	   people	  who	   share	   common	  genetics	  also	  share	   interests	   in	  any	  biotechnological	  products	   that	  are	  created	  using	   their	  DNA.	   	  Therefore,	  we	  should	   re-­‐envision	  how	   the	  property	  rights	  associated	  with	  human	  genetic	  material	  are	  allocated,	  departing	  from	  a	  paradigm	  of	  individual	  ownership,	   legally	  acknowledging	  a	  ge-­‐netic	  reality.	  
A.	  A	  New	  Bioethics	  in	  United	  States	  &	  International	  Patent	  Law	  To	  comprehensively	  reconceptualize	  American	  property	  law	  theo-­‐ry	   in	   the	  context	  of	  ownership	  of	  human	  genetic	  material	  would	  be	  a	  daunting	  undertaking.	   	  However,	   initial	  steps	  could	  be	  taken	  to	   intro-­‐	  	   94.	   	  Michael	  J.	  Malinowski,	  Could	  Biobanking	  be	  a	  Means	  to	  Include	  “Health	  Care	  Have-­‐Nots”	  in	  
the	  Genomics	  Revolution?,	  9	  DEPAUL	  J.	  HEALTH	  CARE	  L.	  1005,	  1008	  (2005).	  	   95.	   	  Id.	  at	  1005–06.	  	   96.	   	  Id.	  at	  1019–20.	  	   97.	   	  Hayden,	   supra	   note	   66,	   at	   746	   (discussing	   the	   position	   of	  Merz,	   et	   al.	   (2002)	   and	   the	  HUGO	  Ethics	  Committee)	  (emphasis	  in	  original).	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  14:2	  duce	  a	  bioethics	  of	  distributive	  justice	  into	  the	  extant	  intellectual	  prop-­‐erty	  law	  framework	  in	  the	  relatively	  near	  future.	  	  For	  instance,	  the	  U.S.	  Patent	  Office	  (“USPTO”)	  apparently	  does	  not	  conduct	  any	  review	  of	  the	  source	  of	  the	  biological	  material	  in	  patent	  applications	  involving	  genet-­‐ic	   resources.98	   	   Since	   the	   USPTO	   has	   yet	   to	   implement	   any	   sort	   of	  “Model	   Ethical	   Protocol”	   or	   other	   form	   of	   “ethical	   review,”	   proposals	  such	  as	  the	  “Carvalho	  Requirement”	  have	  been	  advanced.99	  The	   Carvalho	   Requirement	  would	   establish	   as	   a	   prerequisite	   for	  patentability	   of	   biotechnologies	   the	   “requirement	   that	   applicants	   for	  patents	  in	  the	  field	  of	  biotechnology	  disclose	  the	  source	  of	  the	  genetic	  resources	   eventually	   used	   as	   raw	  materials	   or	   tools	   in	   the	   inventive	  activity.”100	   	   The	  disclosure	   of	   the	   source	   of	   genetic	   resources	   can	   be	  understood	  as	  a	  safeguard	  against	  the	  improper	  assertion	  by	  research-­‐ers	  of	  rights	  over	  biological	  material	  collected	  from	  vulnerable	  popula-­‐tions,	   such	   as	   indigenous	   groups.101	   	   Any	   reconsideration	   of	   the	   role	  that	  ethics	  play	  in	  patent	  law	  should	  not	  be	  limited	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  Indeed,	  in	  an	  increasingly	  global	  economy	  the	  role	  of	  ethics	  should	  be	  considered	  on	  a	  worldwide	  basis,	  given	  the	  backdrop	  of	  multilateral	  IP	  agreements	  such	  as	  TRIPS.102	  Furthermore,	   mechanisms	   for	   protecting	   the	   “groups	   between”	  are	   especially	   important	   given	   the	   practice	   of	   transnational	   genetic	  sampling	   from	   indigenous	   groups.	   	   Concerns	   have	   principally	   been	  expressed	   over	   “biocolonialism,”	   a	   phenomenon	   in	   which	   “isolated	  indigenous	  groups	  have	  become	  an	  ever-­‐limited	  and	   rare	   ‘source’	   for	  the	  research	  community,”103	  especially	  researchers	  from	  industrialized	  nations	   such	  as	   the	  United	  States.	   	  Generally,	   it	   has	  been	  argued	   that	  “developed	  countries’	  patent-­‐based	  systems	  and	  the	  developing	  coun-­‐tries’	   sovereign-­‐based	   systems	  have	  overreached	   in	  permitting	  or	   as-­‐serting	   ownership	   rights	   over	   genetic	   material.”104	   	   Thus,	   the	   patent	  offices	   in	   wealthy,	   industrialized	   countries	   should	   take	   international	  implications	  into	  account	  when	  setting	  the	  guidelines	  for	  patent	  exam-­‐iners’	  evaluation	  of	  patents	  in	  human	  genetic	  material,	  especially	  when	  	  	   98.	   	  Marina	  L.	  Whelan,	  What,	   If	  Any,	  Are	   the	  Ethical	  Obligations	  of	   the	  U.S.	   Patent	  Office?:	  A	  
Closer	   Look	   at	   the	   Biological	   Sampling	   of	   Indigenous	   Groups,	   2006	   DUKE	   L.	   &	   TECH.	   REV.	   14,	   20	  (2006).	  	   99.	   	  Id.	  at	  23.	  	   100.	   	  Nuno	  Pires	  de	  Carvalho,	  Requiring	  Disclosure	  of	  the	  Origin	  of	  Genetic	  Resources	  and	  Prior	  
Informed	  Consent	  in	  Patent	  Applications	  Without	  Infringing	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement:	  The	  Problem	  and	  
the	  Solution,	  2	  WASH.	  U.	  J.	  L.	  &	  POL’Y	  371,	  374	  (2000).	  	   101.	   	  Whelan,	  supra	  note	  98,	  at	  26.	  	   102.	   	  Ho,	  supra	  note	  41,	  at	  526.	  	   103.	   	  Id.	  at	  525.	  	   104.	   	  Safrin,	  supra	  note	  57,	  at	  641–42.	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  that	  material	  is	  sourced	  from	  vulnerable	  populations	  in	  the	  developing	  world.105	  Beyond	  the	  protections	  that	  could	  result	  from	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  new	  bioethical	  framework	  within	  national	  patent	  offices,	  some	  com-­‐mentators	   contend	   that	   a	   new	   international	   regime	   is	   necessary	   to	  realize	  distributive	  justice	  in	  biomedical	  research.	   	  For	  instance,	  Baird	  has	  proposed	  an	  “individual/community	  property	  rights	  model,”	  to	  be	  enacted	   through	   a	   prospective	   international	   agreement	   under	   which	  each	   country	   would	   adopt	   legislation	   to	   become	   compliant	   with	   five	  principles	   related	   especially	   to	   informed	   consent	   and	   benefit	   shar-­‐ing.106	  	  These	  principles	  include	  provisions	  that	  grant	  individuals	  own-­‐ership	  rights	  over	  the	  tissues	  which	  they	  may	  freely	  decide	  to	  “donate,”	  and	   that	   conceptualize	   donated	   tissue	   as	   community	   property.107	  	  Global	  adoption	  of	  Baird’s	  model—or	  even	  serious	  consideration	  of	  its	  implications	  in	  countries	  like	  the	  United	  States—may	  be	  unlikely.	  Yet	  it	  is	   important	  to	  recognize	  that	  advances	   in	  modern	  biotechnology	  will	  necessarily	   dictate	   the	   evolution	   of	   contemporary	   tangible	   and	   intel-­‐lectual	  property	  legal	  frameworks	  at	  some	  future	  moment.	  At	  such	  a	  time,	  it	  will	  be	  fundamental	  to	  consider	  how	  the	  issue	  of	  ownership	  of	  human	  tissue	  relates	  to	  broader	  sociocultural	  questions,	  “such	  as	  struggles	  over	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state,	  philanthropy,	  and	  the	  pri-­‐vate	   sector	   in	   allocating	   resources;	   questions	   about	   the	   relationship	  between	  entitlements	  and	  rights;	  and	  perhaps	  most	  vividly,	  questions	  about	  how	  new	   forms	  of	  privatization	  seem	  to	  give	   rise	   to	  a	   range	  of	  ‘public-­‐izations’	  or	  processes	  of	  producing	  collectives,	  the	  implications	  of	  which	  are	  far	  from	  self-­‐evident.”108	  In	   other	  words,	   although	   the	   debate	   over	   property	   rights	   in	   hu-­‐man	   genetic	   material	   represents	   one	   conversation	   about	   how	   legal	  paradigms	  could	  be	  shifted	  from	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  individual	  to	  the	  collec-­‐tive,	  such	  discussions	  are	  potentially	  numerous.	  	  Thus,	  frameworks	  for	  how	  property	  rights	  over	  human	  genetic	  materials	  are	  allocated	  should	  	  	   105.	   	  Id.	  at	  675.	  	   106.	   	  Melanie	   Baird,	  When	   and	  Why	   Does	  What	   Belong	   to	  Whom?	   A	   Proposed	  Model	   for	   the	  
International	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Donors	  of	  Biological	  Material,	  32	  CAN.-­‐US.	  L.J.	  331,	  347	  (2006).	  	   107.	   	  The	  principles	  as	   fully	  enumerated	  are:	  (1)	   Informed	  consent	   is	  obtained	  from	  all	  who	  donate	   tissue;	   (2)	   Each	   individual	   may	   independently	   decide	   whether	   or	   not	   to	   donate	   their	  
tangible	  property,	   their	  tissue,	  to	  research;	  (3)	  Donated	  tissue	  is	  viewed	  as	  community	  property	  and	  a	  percentage	  of	  any	  profits	  made	  from	  the	  commercialization	  of	  this	  shared	  property	  must	  be	  allocated;	  (4)	  Each	  country	  will	  establish	  an	  administrative	  agency,	  an	  arbitration	  panel,	  a	  tribu-­‐nal,	  or	  a	  similar	  objective,	  non-­‐profit	  body	  .	  .	  .	  [which	  will]	  select	  projects	  and	  organizations	  that	  best	   represent	   the	   community	  of	   interest	  of	   tissue	  donors.	   	  Allocated	  profits	  will	  be	   shared	  be-­‐tween	  those	  selected;	  (5)	  The	  same	  non-­‐profit	  agency	  described	  in	  (4)	  shall	  have	  the	  authority	  to	  grant	  compulsory	  licenses.	  	  Id.	  at	  347–48	  (emphasis	  added).	  	  	   108.	   	  Hayden,	  supra	  note	  66,	  at	  753.	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  be	   reimagined	   in	   a	  manner	   consistent	  with	   principles	   of	   distributive	  justice.	   	  In	  so	  doing,	  provisions	  from	  the	  alternative	  models	  of	  owner-­‐ship	  discussed	  in	  Part	  IV	  of	  this	  Article	  should	  be	  considered.	  	  Until	  this	  future	   manifests,	   the	   voices	   of	   members	   of	   vulnerable	   populations	  should	  be	  better	  translated	   into	   international	   law	  and	  policy,	   through	  efforts	   of	   community	   empowerment	   and	   participatory	   democracy.109	  	  A	  distributive	  justice	  foundation	  may	  then	  be	  laid,	  if	  only	  in	  theory.	  CONCLUSION	  The	   diverse	   practices	   surrounding	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   biobank-­‐ing—including	   biomedical	   research	   and	   derivative	   health	   care	   tech-­‐nologies—offer	   tremendous	   promise	   for	   the	   propagation	   of	   greater	  social	   good.	   	   Indeed,	   if	  done	  according	   to	   sound	  bioethical	  principles,	  biobanking	   initiatives	   could	   help	   to	   alleviate	   the	   suffering	   resultant	  from	   illness	   and	   disease,	   while	   also	   promoting	   distributive	   justice	  through	   benefit	   sharing.	   	   To	   best	   achieve	   these	   ends,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	  current	  models	   for	  ownership	  of	  human	  genetic	  material	  will	  need	  to	  be	  radically	  redesigned.	  	  In	  so	  doing,	  human	  genetic	  material	  should	  be	  conceptualized	   as	   community,	   rather	   than	   individual,	   property.	   	   The	  human	   body	   may	   thus	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   “tangible	   and	   intangible	  complex,”110	   with	   the	   ownership	   interests	   therein	   allocated	   between	  tissue	  donors	  and	  communities,	  but	  not	  inherently	  vested	  in	  research-­‐ers,	  institutions,	  governments,	  or	  corporations.	  	  
	  	   109.	   	  For	  an	  example	  of	  how	  participatory	  democracy	  may	  be	  leveraged	  to	  achieve	  such	  ends,	  see	   Vence	   L.	   Bonham,	   et	   al.,	   Community-­‐Based	   Dialogue:	   Engaging	   Communities	   of	   Color	   in	   the	  
United	  States’	  Genetics	  Policy	  Conversation,	  34	  J.	  HEALTH	  POL.	  POL’Y	  &	  L.	  325	  (2009)	  (discussing	  the	  Communities	  of	  Color	  Genetics	  Policy	  Project,	  which	  engaged	  individuals	  from	  African	  American	  and	  Latino	   communities	   of	   diverse	   socioeconomic	   levels	   in	   the	   process	   of	   “rational	   democratic	  deliberation”	  on	  ethical	  and	  policy	  issues	  including	  genome	  research).	  	   110.	   	  See	  Bellivier	  &	  Noiville,	  supra	  note	  2.	  
